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Abstract
We study US divorce rates, which despite the continuing rise in female labor force
participation (FLFP), have been falling since the mid-1980s, reversing a two-decade
trend. A cross section of U.S. states for the year 2000 displays a negative relationship
between the divorce rate and FLFP.
We present theory and evidence in support of the view that these recent trends are
the product of two distinct economic forces: relative to their non-career counterparts,
career women display greater selectivity in the search for marriage partners and greater
ﬂexibility in sharing the beneﬁts of a marriage with their partners.
Greater selectivity implies that career women will be older when they ﬁrst marry
and that their marriages will be of higher average “quality,” possibly making them less
prone to breakup. Greater ﬂexibility implies that it is easier for two-earner families
to re-adjust the intrahousehold allocation to compensate for changes in outside oppor-
tunities, making marriages more resistant to “shocks.” Our evidence shows that both
eﬀects may be playing a role in generating the trends the trends.
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From the early 1960s through the early 1980s, the divorce rate and the female labor force
participation rate (FLFP) in the U.S. both trended upward. A large, multidisciplinary
literature has oﬀered many suggestions as to why this should be so. In the past two decades,
however, the divorce rate has fallen, while FLFP continues to rise. Moreover, a cross section
of U.S. states for the year 2000 displays a negative relationship between the divorce rate and
FLFP. This evidence suggests that something is missing from existing theories that connect
FLFP and divorce.
In our empirical analysis, the most important variables that are negatively correlated
with divorce are the median age at ﬁrst marriage (MAFM) and FLFP, even when both are
present in the same speciﬁcation. After exploring the evidence in greater depth, showing
for instance that these two variables’ contributions persist controlling for education, income
inequality, and a number of demographic characteristics, we go on to suggest two economic
forces that may be generating the trends. Relative to their non-career counterparts, career
women display greater selectivity in the search for marriage partners and greater ﬂexibility in
sharing the beneﬁts of a marriage with their partners.1 The selectivity eﬀect can be expected
to be strongly associated with delaying the age at ﬁrst marriage, but is less successful at
explaining the additional contribution of FLFP.
One distinguishing feature of a career woman is that she values a marriage of given
quality less than a non-career woman, because she has her own means of ﬁnancial support.
We show that this implies she will be choosier in selecting a partner; on average she will
marry later and the quality of her marriage will be higher, leading to a lower chance of
divorce. Countering this “ex-ante” selectivity eﬀect, however, is an “ex-post” one: a career
woman will be less tolerant of low-quality marriage; this could lead to higher divorce rates
for career women relative to non-career women who marry at the same age.
The other distinguishing feature of the career woman is that the earnings she derives
from the labor market facilitates surplus transfer between her and her partner. This is the
origin of the ﬂexibility eﬀect: a marriage with two career partners is more stable than a
marriage with only one career partner, simply because it is easier for the career partners to
compensate each other for outside “temptations.” We argue that this eﬀect may have become
stronger over the years with increasing marketization of formerly household-produced goods
and with the narrowing of the gender earnings gap since the mid-1980s.
Existing explanations connecting divorce and FLFP are varied, but all suggest that FLFP
and divorce rates should covary.2 Most ﬁnd causality running from FLFP to divorce rates:
1By “career woman” we mean one who works regardless of marital status; in 2000, over 85% of single
women 25 to 34 were working, while only 70% of married women were. In our theoretical analysis, this is
the distinction that is crucial for establishig the diﬀerential behavior of one-and two-earner fahouseholds.
See also Goldin (1995).
2Rasul (2006) suggests that changes in divorce law would have led to temporary increases in divorce that
would then have fallen back to trend levels, which have in fact been falling over the past twenty years; see
also Wolfers (2006). It is not clear whether this “pipeline” eﬀect can account for the whole trend over forty
2career women are more independent and therefore willing to divorce, (Nock, 2001); the
incomes of husbands and wives are substitutes, making marriage between equals less valuable
(Becker et al., 1977); there is increased marital conﬂict within career couples (Mincer, 1985;
Spitz and South, 1985), etc. An important strand ﬁnds causality running the other way:
in the face of rising divorce rates, even married women have increased incentives to invest
in careers, as a kind of self insurance — precautionary working, as it were (Greene and
Quester, 1982; Johnson and Skinner, 1986) or because they spend less of their adult life
in marriage, thus reaping fewer returns from specializing in the home, and having greater
incentives to make larger investments in market work (Stevenson, 2007). Finally, some
authors have suggested that the two trends reﬂect a spurious correlation: improvements in
home production technology, which both lowers the opportunity cost of working and reduces
the value of a marriage, have contributed to increased FLFP and to increases in divorce
(Ogburn and Nimkoﬀ, 1955; Greenwood and Gruner, 2004). In recent work, Stevenson and
Wolfers (2007) suggest that other technological factors, such as the contraceptive pill, and
changes in the wage structure, that have been found to be important determinant for the
increase in labor force participation of married women might also be responsible for the
concurrent increase in divorce rate.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: in the next section we present the empirical
evidence about the relationship between FLFP and divorce. In Section 3 we discuss the
selectivity eﬀect, and in Section 4 the ﬂexibility eﬀect. In Section 5 we explain how our
analysis can account for the shift from consent to unilateral divorce law that has swept the
US during the 70s. Finally, Section 6 oﬀer concluding remarks. Detailed descriptions of the
data and some theoretical arguments are relegated to the appendix.
2. The Relationship between FLFP and Divorce
The trend reversal of the past two decades is illustrated in Figure 1. From 1980 to 2000, the
rate of divorce in the US fell from 5.3 to 4.2 per 1000 people per year, undoing more than a
third of the increase of the previous two decades. Meanwhile FLFP continued to rise, from
50% to 62%.

































































Figure 1: Divorce rate (per 1000 population) and Married Women’s LFP: 1960-2000
What is more, if one looks at a cross section of US states, one ﬁnds a negative relationship
between the divorce rate and FLFP. Figure 2 shows how the divorce rates, per 1,000 popula-
tion, and labor force participation rates of married women vary across U.S. states in the year
2000. The divorce rate is high in states like Alabama, Kentucky and West Virginia where
married women’s labor force participation rates are relatively low - around 60%. Divorce
rates tend to be lowest in states like Minnesota, Massachusetts, Vermont and Iowa where
more than 70% of married women participate to the labor force. The (population-weighted)
correlation coeﬃcient between the two series is sizable, -0.5, and is statistically signiﬁcant
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Figure 2: LFP rates of married women and divorce rates by state, 2000
Both the time-series and the cross-section evidence suggest that something is missing
from the existing explanations for the relationship between FLFP and divorce. As explained
in the introduction, this paper presents and discusses two economic forces that seem to have
been overlooked by earlier analyses and that could account for the recent trends. However,
before delving into a deeper explanation of these economic forces, we establish the robustness
of the empirical ﬁndings described above.
We show that the cross section result holds even after controlling for a number of state-
level characteristics that might account for a negative relationship between FLFP and divorce
rates. For example, it has been shown (Martin, 2005) that more educated women are less
likely to divorce than uneducated women, as well as more likely to work, so that as the
average level of education in the female population increases, the divorce rate should fall.
But controlling for the mean level of female education in the state, the negative correlation
between FLFP and divorce persists. This correlation remains even after controlling for
a number of other state-level demographic and economic characteristics such as income
inequality and the median age at ﬁrst marriage.
In Table 1 we present the results of state-level regressions of divorce rates on LFP of
married women.3 It also reports the results for speciﬁcations that progressively add factors,
such as median age at ﬁrst marriage, marriage rates, male income inequality, educational
attainment, gender concentration by occupation and other socioeconomic and demographic
variables (race and religion), that might be driving the negative cross-state correlation. In
the basic regression, column 1, we ﬁnd that a 10% diﬀerence in labor force participation rates
3See Data Appendix for a detailed discussion of data sources and variable deﬁnitions. In all the regressions


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 of married women across states translates into a lower divorce rate by 0.83. The estimate is
signiﬁc a n ta tt h e1p e r c e n tl e v e l .S i n c et h ea v e r a g ed i v o r c er a t ei s4 . 2p e r1 , 0 0 0p o p u l a t i o n
this is a sizeable number (roughly corresponding to a 20% lower divorce rate).
Column 2 in the Table reports the results of the regression when we also control for age
at ﬁrst marriage, the variable that captures our selectivity eﬀect. Both the FLFP and age
coeﬃcients are negative, sizeable, and statistically signiﬁcant at the one percent level. In
this case, we ﬁnd that a 10% diﬀerence in labor force participation rates of married women
across states translates into a lower divorce rate by 0.51 (a 40% reduction relative to the
estimate in column 1) and a 1 year diﬀerence in age at ﬁrst marriage translates into a lower
divorce rate by approximately 0.42. Married women labor force participation and age at
ﬁrst marriage are both important: taken together they can explain 40 percent of the overall
cross-state variation in divorce rates (by adding a series of controls we can only increase the
adjusted R-squared coeﬃcient to 0.6). The importance of selectivity is not surprising given
the strong negative association between age at ﬁrst marriage and divorce rates, pointing to
more stable marriages later in life.
There is also a strong positive association between median age at ﬁrst marriage and
FLFP (correlation coeﬃcient = 0.37, signiﬁcant at the 1% level, not shown), indicating that
career women might be more selective in their choice of a partner and, as a consequence,
have more stable marriages. Nevertheless, FLFP remains signiﬁcant after including age at
ﬁrst marriage, suggesting that selectivity does not fully explain the trend.
Our results are robust to the inclusion of a string of additional explanatory variables, as
shown by columns 3 to 9. For example, one could argue that the negative correlation between
age at ﬁr s tm a r r i a g ea n dd i v o r c er a t e si sd r i v e nb yt h ef a c tt h a th i g h e rm a l ei n c o m ei n e q u a l i t y
increases the option value of a marriage thus increasing women’s incentives to search longer
for a partner (Gould and Paserman, 2003). This would decrease the marriage rate and, if
waiting longer allows to form better matches, would also lower divorce rates thus generating
a negative correlation between age at ﬁrst marriage and divorce rates. However, this seems
not to be the case (see column 4). In addition, higher male income inequality cannot account
for the negative correlation between FLFP and div o r c er a t e( a n dp o s i t i v ec o r r e l a t i o nb e t w e e n
FLFP and age at ﬁrst marriage) unless one is willing to assume that FLFP causes higher
male inequality. Another possibility that has been discussed in the literature (McKinnish,
2004) is that lower occupational sex-segregation increased the meeting rate with opposite sex
co-workers. This in turn would lead to higher marital instability. However, if this were the
case, we should observe high FLFP state being characterized by higher, not lower, divorce
rates. In any case controlling for a state-level measure of gender concentration by occupation
(column 5) does not alter our results.
The negative correlation between divorce rates and FLFP of married women remains
sizeable and signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations.4 What could account for these ﬁndings? We
4We have experimented with alternative measures of married women labor force participation, such as
full- and part-time participation, labor force participation of white women and labor force participation of
25-54 year old women. For all speciﬁcations we obtain results similar to the ones reported here.
6argue that the fact that a woman works, thereby deriving monetary income, diﬀerentiates
her from her noncareer counterpart in two important respects that aﬀect the functioning
of the “marriage market.” We refer to the ﬁrst such eﬀect as selectivity, which pertains to
behavior before marriage. The second eﬀect is ﬂexibility, which has to do with behavior
inside the marriage. We hypothesize that career women will be more selective about whom
they marry and more ﬂexible in sharing surplus with their partners once they are married.
Greater selectivity implies that the career woman will search longer for a mate, waiting
for indications of higher marital “quality” than an otherwise similar non-career woman. On
average, then, we expect career women to be older than non-career women when they ﬁrst
marry and to have higher quality marriages, hence lower divorce rates. Our data support
these conclusions: states with higher married women’s LFP have higher median age at ﬁrst
marriage, and that variable in turn is negatively correlated with divorce rates.
Greater ﬂexibility implies that once a “crisis” does occur, it is easier to ﬁnd a compromise
a l l o c a t i o no fr e s o u r c e sw i t h i nt h eh o u s e h o l dw h e nb o t hp a r t n e r sw o r kt h a nw h e no n eo ft h e m
doesn’t. The reason is that with two earners in the household, surplus is more transferable.
In this case, the distribution of resources within the household is irrelevant to the decision
whether to continue a marriage: only the total surplus matters. In contrast, when one
member of the household doesn’t work, and therefore has only more costly instruments for
surplus transfer, there are occasions when total surplus might be high enough to warrant
continuation of the marriage, but the diﬃculties in arriving at a split of the surplus that
compensates both partners for outside options results in marital breakup.
Both eﬀects are likely to be important in explaining the trend: we have already mentioned
the evidence for the selectivity eﬀect; the fact that FLFP still negatively aﬀects divorce even
controlling for age of ﬁrst marriage suggests that ﬂexibility is also playing a role.
3. The Selectivity Eﬀect
T h ed a t as h o wt h a ts t a t e sw i t hh i g h e rF L F Pa l s oh a v eah i g h e rm e d i a na g ea tﬁrst marriage
and lower overall divorce rate. In this section we present a simple search model that tries to
capture these two eﬀects as resulting from greater selectivity of career women when choosing
a marriage partner.
As appealing as selectivity may be as an explanation, its eﬀects are not as straightforward
as might appear, because it actually operates in opposite directions before and after marriage.
Assuming career women suﬀer less disutility from career than non-career women, they have
lower search costs and will therefore be more selective by setting higher “reservation levels”
of expected marriage quality. This will lead them to marry later on average and have higher
average quality of marriages, which might be expected to reduce their divorce rate.
But this “ex-ante” selectivity eﬀect has to confront an “ex-post” selectivity eﬀect if it is to
explain divorce trends, and this proves theoretically delicate. Career women will also be more
selective about remaining married: they will divorce for a larger range of realized marriage
7qualities than their non-career counterparts. Thus, ex-ante eﬀect must be suﬃciently strong
to skew the conditional distribution of marriage qualities enough to overcome the ex-post
eﬀect. In particular, while delaying marriage might lead women to make better choices,
so that divorce rates may be lower overall when there are more career women, the ex-ante
eﬀect must also explain why divorce rates are apparently lower for career women who happen
to marry early. While this is certainly possible, its theoretical likelihood does not appear
overwhelming.
3.1. A Search Model
Consider the following model. There are two types of agents: males and females. Time is
discrete and inﬁnite, however males and females have only two chances to be matched and
married with each other. In the ﬁrst period, agents meet a potential partner and receive
as i g n a lσ of the match quality φ/2 (value of public good for each). If the couple decide
to marry, they learn the true quality in the next period. After learning quality, they either
remain married forever (since quality is ﬁxed for all time) or they divorce. We assume, for
simplicity, that there is no remarriage.
If the agents do not marry in the ﬁrst period, then they go back to the search market
in the second period. This time, though, they are older and wiser, and we model this in
the extreme way by assuming they can perfectly observe marriage quality before marrying
in the second period.5 Thus they will only marry if the actual quality of their match φ/2
exceeds their utility when single, s.
The males all work and earn w. Females, both career and noncareer, also earn w. An
agent’s utility from private consumption is c − ¯ c − Id for c ≥ ¯ c and −D − Id for c<¯ c;
here I is the indicator function assuming the value 1 if the agent works, zero otherwise. The
diﬀerence between non career females and career females as well as males is that d =0for
the latter while d = dN >w>2¯ c for the former. Assume D>d N.
We assume that utility is fully transferable. Under these assumptions, career females
work whether married or not. Non career females work if single but not if married (the
married couple’s surplus in the latter case is 2w−2¯ c−dN if she works, which is less than the
w − 2¯ c obtained when she doesn’t). Assume that in the latter case, the non career female
produces an additional local public good ϕ =¯ c that makes her male partner indiﬀerent
between marrying her and marrying a career female (this is a simple way of abstracting from
general equilibrium eﬀects on search strategies that would depend on the fraction of career
women in the population).
5This is the main departure from standard analysis (Jovanovic, 1984; Bougheas and Georgellis, 1999;
Rasul, 2006), which tends to assume stationarity of the signal structure. There are two problems here (aside
from its empirical implausibility in this context). First, because of ex-post selectivity, it doesn’t clearly
result in lower divorce rates among two-earner than one-earner households. Moreover, it may not even lead
to delayed marriage among working agents: nonworking agents in such a world have a stronger incentive to
wait for good signals (if they don’t discount the future too much), since they are likely to remain married
longer than working agents.
8The ﬂow utility while single (either unmarried or divorced) is therefore w − ¯ c for career
females, and w − ¯ c − dN for non career females. Because of transferable utility, we can just
as well consider the ﬂow to a potential couple, which is obtained by adding w − ¯ c to these
expressions. When married, the ﬂow is w − 2¯ c + φ + ϕ for a couple with a noncareer agent
and 2w − 2¯ c + φ for one with two career agents. Thus we can normalize the ﬂow in terms
of the diﬀerence between the unmarried and the married states to be s when single (either
before or after marriage) and φ when married, where s =0for career, and s = −dN < 0 for
noncareer.
It is important to note that greater selectivity need not imply that divorce is less probable
overall for two-earner families, because their divorce probability need not be lower if they
happened to marry in the ﬁrst period: when s rises, one is more willing to divorce, so even if
one’s marriage quality is higher on average, the divorce probability might rise nonetheless.
In fact, somewhat lengthy calculations show that the probability of divorce for those who
marry in period 1, will be increasing in s for a broad range of parameters. (Therefore if
we had assumed a stationary signal structure, we would be unable to show that selectivity
robustly implies a lowering of divorce rates — the nonstationarity appears crucial.)
T h ei m p o r t a n tp o i n ti st h a te m p i r i c a l l y ,t h es e l e c t i v i t ye ﬀect would manifest itself largely
through the delay in marriage rather than through a reduction in divorce given age at
marriage. Thus the fact that FLFP still enters negatively in our regressions when controlling
for the age at marriage suggests that the ﬂexibility eﬀe c ti sp l a y i n gar o l e ,a n di sn o tar e s i d u a l
of the selectivity eﬀect uncaptured by controlling for the age at marriage.
3.2. Example.
Suppose that:
single career females obtain a payoﬀ of s =0in every period in which they are single;
single non career females obtain a payoﬀ of s = −1 in every period in which they are
single;
marriage is worth X, Y, and Z each period with probabilities x, y, and z respectively.
Suppose that X<−1 <Y <0 <Z ,and xX + yY + zZ > 0.
agents discount their future utility by β.
Suppose that women observe a signal about the quality of the match in the ﬁrst matching
period. Suppose that the signal, σ ≤ 1 − y, i st h ep r o b a b i l i t yt h a tt h em a r r i a g ew o u l db e
of high quality. The probability that the marriage is of the intermediate quality is known to
be equal to y.
An o nc a r e e rw o m a n( w i t hs<Y) who observes a signal σ obtains the following expected
payoﬀ from marrying in the ﬁrst match period:
(1 − y − σ)X + yY + σZ +
β
1 − β
[(1 − y − σ)s + yY + σZ]





[xs + yY + zZ]
Such a woman would therefore marry in the ﬁrst period IFF
(1 − y − σ)X + yY + σZ +
β
1 − β
[(1 − y − σ)s + yY + σZ] ≥ s +
β
1 − β
[xs + yY + zZ]
IFF
σ ≥
(1 − β)s − (1 − β)((1 − y)X + yY)+βz(Z − s)
Z − (1 − β)X − βs
A career woman (with s>Y) who observes a signal σ obtains the following expected
payoﬀ from marrying in the ﬁrst match period:
(1 − y − σ)X + yY + σZ +
β
1 − β
[(1 − y − σ)s + ys+ σZ]





[xs + ys+ zZ]
Such a woman would therefore marry in the ﬁrst period IFF
(1 − y − σ)X + yY + σZ +
β
1 − β
[(1 − y − σ)s + ys+ σZ] ≥ s +
β
1 − β
[xs + ys+ zZ]
IFF
σ ≥
(1 − β)s − (1 − β)((1 − y)X + yY)+βz(Z − s)
Z − (1 − β)X − βs
O b s e r v et h a tt h et h r e s h o l ds i g n a la b o v ew h i c hs u c haw o m a nm a r r i e si nt h eﬁrst period
is increasing in s, which implies that a career woman is more likely to delay her marriage
than a non career woman.6
If we assume that σ is uniformly distributed on the longest possible interval on which
it can be distributed, then since it must be that E [σ]=z, it must be that if 2z<1 − y
then σ ∼ U [0,2z], and if 2z>1 − y then σ ∼ U [2z − (1 − y),1 − y].T h ef a c tt h a tm o r e
than half of the couples never divorce is consistent with z ≥ 1/2, which is consistent with
the latter uniform distribution. We therefore assume that σ ∼ U [2z − (1 − y),1 − y] and
proceed to calculate the likelihood of divorce conditional on marriage in the ﬁrst period and





(1 − β)s − (1 − β)((1− y)X + yY)+βz(Z − s)
Z − (1 − β)X − βs
¶
=
(1 − β)(Z (1 − zβ) − Yyβ− X (1 − (z + y)β))
(X − Z − Xβ+ sβ)
2
> 0
10A career woman who marries in the ﬁrst period divorces with probability 1 − σ, where
σ ≥ σC ≡ σ(s =0 ). Taking an expectation of signals, the expected rate of divorce for such
a woman is:






A non career woman who marries in the ﬁrst period divorces with probability 1 − y − σ,
where σ ≥ σN ≡ σ(s = −1). Taking an expectation of signals, the expected rate of divorce
f o rs u c haw o m a ni s :






A career woman is therefore more likely to divorce than a non career woman conditional on














2y ≥ σC − σN
Because σ(s) is increasing in y (at a rate of Y − X for a ﬁxed s) this inequality is satisﬁed
as long as y is “large enough.” For example, if we assume that
sC =0
sN = −1
β = .9 (close to 1)
z = .5
Y = −ε (close to 0)
Z = −X +1
then it is satisﬁed approximately for all values of y ≥ 0.
Observe that under this parametrization,
σC ≡ σ(s =0 )
≈
−.1(1− y)X + .45(1 − X)
1 − X − .1X
and
σN ≡ σ(s = −1)
≈
−.1 − .1(1− y)X + .45(1 − X +1 )
1 − X − .1X + .9
And
2y − (σC − σN) ≈ 2y −
−.1(1− y)X + .45(1 − X)
1 − X − .1X
+
−.1 − .1(1− y)X + .45(1 − X +1 )




112y − (σC − σN) ≈ 2y −
−.1(1− y)X + .45(1 − X)
1 − X − .1X
+
−.1 − .1(1− y)X + .45(1 − X +1 )




Denote the rate of divorce of a career and non career woman conditional on having
married in the ﬁrst period by dC and dN, respectively. Then, overall divorce rate of career
women is lower than that of non career women IFF
1 − y − σC
2(1− y − z)
· dC ≤
1 − y − σN
2(1− y − z)
· dN
Under the parametrization above, this inequality holds approximately IFF
1 − y −
(1 − y)+.45(11)
11 + 1

















1 − y −
−.1+( 1− y)+.45(11 + 1)
1+1 0+1+.9
















IFF y is suﬃciently close to zero.
4. The Flexibility Eﬀect
Compare a marriage in which both partners work with one in which only one partner works.
Assume that other than work status, all characteristics of the partners are identical across
marriages. Assume that upon marriage, a household produces a local public good yielding
utility φ to each partner.7
Upon marriage, the partners will settle on an allocation of goods on the household utility
possibility frontier, e.g. via Nash bargaining relative to the disagreement point of consuming
their respective wages (consistent with the data, it is reasonable to assume that both partners
work prior to marriage — below we model this explicitly when considering the selectivity
eﬀect).
Now suppose one partner experiences a marriage-speciﬁc shock: perhaps it receives an
“outside oﬀer” worth more than the utility it derives in the current marriage.8 The career
spouse of the shocked partner has something that the non-career spouse doesn’t have: money,
7We assume away increasing returns to scale in market purchased goods: allowing it might favor two-
earner households in local public good production, but the greater time budget available for home production
in one-earner households could wash this eﬀect out.
8Similar eﬀects could be obtained from a preference shock, e.g. a change to the utility derived by one
partner from the local public good.
12the instrument par excellence for transferring utility from one partner to the other.9 More
often than not, cash would not be transferred directly; rather cash allows the compensating
partner to purchase (close to) an optimal market basket of goods (plasma TV, fur coat) for
the shocked partner; a non-career spouse can only supply household-produced goods that
are likely to be imperfect substitutes.
In short, the two-earner household well approximates the case of transferable utility. If
the total surplus generated in the current household exceeds that of the outside oﬀer, a new
intra-household allocation can always be found that will keep the shocked partner indiﬀerent
b e t w e e nt h em a r r i a g ea n dt h eo u t s i d eo ﬀer and still leave the spouse better oﬀ than being
single. The marriage stays together. (If the outside oﬀer exceeds the total surplus of the
household, the marriage breaks apart. Either way, the outcome is eﬃcient.)
In the one-earner household, the spouse who doesn’t work has no money to make a coun-
teroﬀer, only less eﬃcient instruments for transferring utility such as payment in household-
produced goods. In some cases, the spouse will not be able to compete with the new oﬀer
and the marriage dissolves. The one-earner household is a case of non- (or imperfectly)
transferable utility, and in some cases the marriage will break up ineﬃciently. We illustrate
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Figure 3: The Flexibility Eﬀect
In both graphs, UM and UF d e n o t et h eu t i l i t yo ft h em a l ea n df e m a l e ,r e s p e c t i v e l y ,wM
and wF denote the income, or wage, of the male and female, respectively, and φ denotes the
value that the male and female each derive from their marriage. The left graph describes
the utility possibility frontier of a married couple where the woman is not working, and the
9Partly this follows from a basic implication of standard consumer theory analysis, which leads to one
of the favorite provocative lessons of intermediate micro teachers everywhere that it is better to give gifts
(or government subsidies) in cash than in kind. One way of seeing this is spelled out in the Appendix. But
also, the immediacy of cash transfers also reduces the incentive problems inherent in (often, delayed) in-kind
t r a n s f e r ss u c ha se ﬀort around the house, favors, etc. For more on the underpinnings and implications of
nontransferability in matching environments, see Legros and Newman (2007).
13right graph describes the utility possibility frontier of a married couple where the woman is
working.
A working spouse, having greater means to transfer utility to the partner than a non-
working one, can do so in case the partner receives an “outside oﬀer.” If partner M receives
an oﬀer such as O that is larger than φ + wM (but less than 2φ + wM + wF) then the one-
earner household will have a greater diﬃculty ﬁnding an allocation that yields M at least
O, whereas the two-earner household could match it. Thus the two-earner household will
more often (i.e. for a ﬁxed distribution of outside oﬀers) remain married than a one-earner
household. Thus, the greater ﬂexibility oﬀered by the cash instrument actually contributes
to the relative stability of the working women’s marriages.
The ﬂexibility eﬀect therefore helps to explain the trend in US divorce rates and the cross
sectional variation in divorce and FLFP we observe at the state level. As more households
become two-earner, there should be greater stability of the marriages that form, all else
the same. More speciﬁcally, the continued signiﬁcance of FLFP in our regressions after
controlling for MAFM (the positive relationship between FLFP and MAFM being the most
robust implication of our selectivity model) supports the view that ﬂexibility is also playing
ar o l e .
4.1. “General Equilibrium” Eﬀects and Law and Economics
So far we have made a purely compositional argument for the ﬂexibility eﬀect’s role in
explaining divorce trends: if we are talking about one couple in a sea of couples, then the
analysis might stop there. But when we are talking about trends, and whether the presence
of more career women accounts for the greater stability of marriage, we are talking about
the whole population, and so the analysis ought not stop here. All else isn’t the same if
we compare two populations, one with few two-earner households, one with many. For a
working spouse might be able to match a given outside oﬀer more easily than a nonworking
spouse, but what if the outside oﬀers are better when there are many two-earner households
than when there are not?
To address this question, we need to allow some mechanism by which the presence of
two-earner households could aﬀect the distribution of oﬀers, and for this we have to allow
for the possibility of remarriage. Elsewhere (Neeman, Newman and Olivetti, 2007) (NNO),
we have studied such a model, which adopts a simple search-and-bargaining framework in
the spirit of Becker et al. (1977). Individuals may encounter potential partners whether or
not they are married (oﬀers by such potential partners constitute the “outside options” that
aﬀect intra-household bargaining). Individuals who work are now potentially able to oﬀer
higher net surplus to potential partners than individuals who don’t. Finally, we take the
degree of female labor force participation to be the exogenous parameter.10
Using these ingredients, we compute aggregate rates of divorce as a function of FLFP
10Of course, LFP is endogenous; but in light of the literature, it’s hard to see how endogenizing it would
explain its negative correlation with divorce, so we feel justiﬁed taking it as exogenous.
14under two forms of divorce law, unilateral and consent. The former allows a divorce if one
partner decides to leave the marriage. The other requires mutual consent of both partners.
The model is therefore useful as well for testing some of the conjectures about divorce law
that have appeared in the literature.
In the fully transferable world of Becker et al., it doesn’t matter which law is in force.
D i v o r c eo c c u r si fa n do n l yi f t h es p o u s ew i t ha no utside opportunity generates higher surplus
outside the marriage than with the current partner. Thus when all women work, the divorce
law is irrelevant.
Not so when there are some non-career women: when there is no longer transferable
utility, in particular for the couple with a nonworking wife, the classical Coasian logic breaks
down. The logic of whether or not a divorce occurs is similar to the logic of auctions with
liquidity constrained bidders (Che and Gale, 1998). For instance, a married woman and
a single woman might “compete” for the ﬁrst woman’s husband. A nonworking woman is
ﬁnancially constrained relative to a working woman and is therefore disadvantaged relative
to a working woman. Consequently, a married working woman may be able to ineﬃciently
retain her husband in the face of a proposal from a nonworking woman, and a married
nonworking woman may not be able to match the oﬀer made to her husband by a single
working woman, which would result in ineﬃcient divorce.
Under unilateral divorce, there will be both ineﬃcient divorces, as husbands of nonwork-
ing women are easily wooed away by working women who can easily outbid the nonworking
wife, even if the total surplus of the original marriage is high, and ineﬃcient failures to
divorce, as working married women outbid nonworking single women who propose to their
husbands, even though the total surplus that would be created if husbands were to leave
their working wives and marry nonworking women may be large. The latter eﬀect (but not
the former) is present as well under consent law, so there will be too little divorce, and in
particular there will less divorce than there is under the unilateral law. The diﬀerence in
divorce rate is largest when the level of FLFP is zero percent and declines as the level of
FLFP approaches 100%.
As others (Wolfers, 2006; Rasul, 2006) have noted, when a state switches from consent
to unilateral divorce (as most have, beginning in the early 1970s) there ought to be a sudden
increase in divorces as the economy moves from the lower consent-divorce FLFP-divorce rate
curve to the higher unilateral-divorce curve; over time, as FLFP increases, divorce rates will
eventually tend to decline
This suggests a possible eﬃciency explanation for the nearly universal switch in US state
d i v o r c el a w sf r o mc o n s e n tt ou n i l a t e r a l . T h ep o i n th a sb e e nm a d et h a tc o n s e n td i v o r c ei s
transactionally very costly, while unilateral divorce is much less so (e.g. Hakim, 2006). The
above discussion implies that when FLFP rises enough, divorce rates are little aﬀected by
which form of divorce law is in place, and it become eﬃcient to avoid the transaction costs
of consent divorce and impose unilateral divorce law instead. Thus for instance the recent
push in New York (a high FLFP state) to adopt unilateral divorce will likely lead only to a
small initial increase in divorce, with little long-run impact on divorce rates there.
15Under either form of law, the model in NNO predicts an inverted-U relationship between
FLFP and the rate of divorce. When initially FLFP is low, increases in FLFP lead to
increases in the divorce rate, just as earlier studies have suggested. But there is a turning
point, above which further increases in FLFP lead to declines in divorce. The model therefore
accords well with the evidence presented above.
The intuition is that at low levels of FLFP, introducing a small number of working
women destabilizes the nonworking women’s marriages (the working women are unlikely to
meet men already married to working women, so the fact their marriages are more stable
has little eﬀect), thereby raising the divorce rate. At high levels of FLFP, adding more
working women increases the average stability of marriages, while the destabilizing eﬀect
on nonworking women’s marriages is second order (since there are so few of them), and the
d i v o r c er a t ef a l l s .
The ﬂexibility eﬀect could then account for the entire non-monotonic time series relation-
ship between FLFP and divorce rate. But this places considerable import on the remarriage
market, and there are reasons to believe other factors (including the many that have been
suggested in the literature) may have been responsible for the rise in divorce from the 1960’s
to the 1980’s. We will discuss some of them in the conclusion.
5. Conclusion
Why then has there been a decline in divorce rates since the 1980s? One possibility is that
the eﬀects identiﬁed elsewhere in the literature simply ceased to be operative after the mid
1980s. For instance, technological advances (machines to do household work, contraception)
that might have made marriage relatively less valuable (and more fragile) might have diﬀused
more or less completely by the mid-1980s. This by itself doesn’t explain the decline, though,
so we are led to invoke other eﬀects (such as the two we have identiﬁed).
The selectivity eﬀe c t—w h i c ha sw eh a v ep o i n t e do u t ,i sr e a l l yt w oe ﬀects working in
opposite directions — would have become more important simply as more as households be-
come two-earner. However, this assumes that the net eﬀect is indeed to reduce divorce rates.
Moreover, it has a harder time explaining reduced divorce rates for two-earner households
that happen to marry early.
Finally, there are reasons to believe that the ﬂexibility eﬀect has strengthened recently
in the face of two further trends. Observe ﬁr s tt h a ta sp a r t n e r si nam a r r i a g eh a v ee q u a l
incomes, there is greater transferability over a range of surplus levels that is proportional to
the total income (it appears reasonable that the level of public good might vary positively
with total income). Thus as gender earnings gaps have closed (this trend also began in the
mid 1980s), the amount of transferability within two-earner households would have increased.
Our preliminary explorations indicate that gender earnings gaps, which vary across US states,
are positively correlated with divorce rates, as the ﬂexibility model would suggest.
A second trend, apparent since the 1960s, and one that has been particularly strong in
16the US compared to Europe, is the increased availability in the market of goods that were
formerly produced in the home (Freeman and Schettkat, 2005). In the Appendix, we illus-
trate the simple economics of monetary versus in-kind transfers in the context of a simple
household production model. One implication of such a model is that the greater eﬃciency of
monetary transfers depends in part on all (or enough) commodities being available for pur-
chase in the market. Otherwise, the two-earner household will have a smaller transferability
advantage relative to the one—earner household because while the second earner generates
monetary income, she forgoes household production, and those goods are not available for
purchase in the market.
So in the early 1960’s when the market did not eﬀectively supply many household-
producible goods, transferability would not have diﬀered so much across household types.
With “marketization” of household goods, the advantage of money as a means of surplus
transfer has increased, and career women have become better able to make these transfers —
thus the ﬂexibility eﬀect has become increasingly powerful over time. This in turn may have
contributed to the downturn in divorce. We hope to investigate this channel empirically in
future drafts.
17Appendix 1. Data
We use the following data sources:
Marriage and divorce rates: Vital Statistics of the United States (several years). Marriage
and divorce rates used for most states are for 2001. For California and Colorado, 1990 divorce
rates (the last year for which information is available) are used instead. Divorce rates for
Indiana and Colorado are not available after 1980.
Labor force participation, education, race, and income: 2000 Census (IPUMS, 1% sam-
ple). The sample is restricted to working-age population (16-64 years old), not living in
group quarters (GK=1). All state-levels averages and medians (for income) are population-
weighted.
Age at ﬁrst marriage: U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey 2002-2003.
Religion: For all states except Alaska, District of Columbia, and Hawaii, the data is taken
from Beliefnet.com (http://www.beliefnet.com/politics/religiousaﬃliation.html). Data was
compiled by Professor John Green, Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied Politics, University of
Akron, Beliefnet contributing editor. The cited sources are 2004 National Surveys of Reli-
gion and Politics, 2001 American Religious Identiﬁcation Survey, 2000 Glenmary Religious
Congregations and Membership in the U.S., United States Census, 2002 Gallup Polls." For
Alaska, District of Columbia, and Hawaii, data is produced by the Association of Religion
Data Archives (http://www.thearda.com/mapsReports). According to the site, "data [was]
collected by representatives of the Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies
(ASARB)" in 2000. Note that "While quite comprehensive, this data excludes most of the
historically African-American denominations and some other major groups."
“Gender concentration” in industries/occupations: Percentage of working women in in-
dustries, occupations, and industry-occupation cells where the state-level ratio of women
to men is less than 50%. Based on Census data (IPUMS, same samples as above), using
1950-adjusted industry and occupation codes.
Appendix 2. The Flexibility Eﬀect — Transferability with Working and Non-
working Partners
Suppose the two partners have Cobb-Douglass utilities over private goods of h1/3m1/3l1/3
where h is a household-producible good that can also be purchased on the market, m is a
market produced good, and l is leisure. Each partner is endowed with a unit of leisure, the
market wage is w, and ph and pm are the market prices of h and m, which the partners take
as given.
If both partners work, it is straightforward to see that a household’s Pareto eﬃcient




then proportional to q for each partner, and a transfer of utility from one to the other occurs









18If one partner does not work in the market, she can produce h at home; assume, to
put the two kinds of households on an equal footing, that she produces w/ph units of h for
















; this is obtained with one partner working 2/3 of the time in the
market and using the income to purchase m, while the other partner works 2/3 of the time
at home to produce h (this point can also be achieved in the two-earner household with, for







Now, if the working partner wants to transfer starting at any point on the frontier above
u∗, he does this as in the two-earner household. But if the non-working partner wishes to
transfer starting at u∗, for instance if she tries to give all of her utility to her husband, this
would be accomplished by having her set l =0and giving all w/ph of the h that she produces
to her husband. He would then maximize (h0+w/ph)1/3m1/3l1/3 subject to phh0+pmm+wl =
w and h0 ≥ 0 (if h0 can be negative, then the his partner is eﬀectively selling l at price w
















max. The frontier is linear between (u1
max,0) and u∗. This resembles Figure 3.
Observe that if h has only imperfect substitutes on the market (for instance, is not at all
available there), then in fact career women may be at no greater advantage in transferring
to husbands than non-career women.
Since utility transfers are accomplished in diﬀerent ways by the two household types, a
model such as this would in principle enable one to investigate the eﬀects of labor market
participation on intra household allocations as they respond to shocks.
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